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pant of such a chair a task at least equal in difficulty to that of the occupant of any other chair? Surely the zoologist may reasonably claim an equal position and pay to that of the devotee of any other science? The researcher is not a huckster and will not make this claim on his own behalf, but the occupant of this chair may be allowed to do so for him.

THE MAP OF EUROPE AFTER THE WAR

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PRESIDENT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION

WHEN we turn to Austria we are confronted with the great tragedy in the reconstruction of Europe. Of that country it could once be said "*Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube,*" but today, when dynastic bonds have been loosened, the constituent parts of the great but heterogeneous empire which she thus built up have each gone its own way. And for that result Austria herself is to blame. She failed to realize that an empire such as hers could only be permanently retained on a basis of common political and economic interest. Instead of adopting such a policy, however, she exploited rather than developed the subject nationalities, and today their economic, no less than their political independence of her is vital to their existence. Thus it is that the Austrian capital, which occupies a situation unrivalled in Europe, and which before the war numbered over 2,000,000 souls, finds herself with her occupation gone. For the moment Vienna is not necessary either to Austria or to the so-called Succession States, and she will not be necessary to them until she again has definite functions to perform. I do not overlook the fact that Vienna is also an industrial city, and that it, as well as various other towns in Lower Austria, are at present unable to obtain either raw materials for their industries or foodstuffs for their inhabitants. But there are already indications that this state of affairs will shortly be ameliorated by economic treaties with the neighboring States. And what I am particularly concerned with is not the temporary but the permanent effects of the change which has taken place. The entire political re-orientation of Austria is necessary if she is to emerge successfully from her present trials, and such a re-orientation must be brought about with due regard to geographical and ethnical conditions. The two courses which are open to her lead in opposite directions. On

the one hand she may become a member of a Danubian confederation, on the other she may throw in her lot with the German people. The first would really imply an attempt to restore the economic position which she held before the war, but it is questionable whether it is either possible or expedient for her to make such an attempt. A Danubian confederation will inevitably be of slow growth, as it is only under the pressure of economic necessity that it will be joined by the various nationalities of southeastern Europe. The suggestions made by Mr. Asquith, Mr. Keynes, and others, for a compulsory free-trade union would, if carried into effect, be provocative of the most intense resentment among most, if not all, of the states concerned. But even if a Danubian confederation were established it does not follow that Austria would be able to play a part in it similar to that which she played in the Dual Monarchy. With the construction of new railways and the growth of new commercial centers it is probable that much of the trade with the southeast of Europe which formerly passed through Vienna will in future go to the east of that city. Even now Pressburg, or Bratislava, to give it the name by which it will hence be known, is rapidly developing at the expense alike of Vienna and Budapest. Finally, Austria has in the past shown little capacity to understand the Slav peoples, and in any case her position in what would primarily be a Slav confederation would be an invidious one. For these reasons we turn to the suggestion that Austria should enter the German Empire, which, both on geographical and on ethnical grounds, would appear to be her proper place. Geographically she is German, because the bulk of the territory left to her belongs either to the Alpine range or to the Alpine foreland. It is only when we reach the basin of Vienna that we leave the mid-world mountain system and look towards the southeast of Europe across the great Hungarian plain. Ethnically, of course, she is essentially German. Now although my argument hitherto has rather endeavored to show that the transfer of territory from one state to another on purely economic grounds is seldom to be justified, it is equally indefensible to argue that two states which are geographically and ethnically related are not to be allowed to unite their fortunes because it would be to their interest to do so. And that it would be to their interest there seems little doubt. Austria would still be able to derive some of her raw materials and foodstuffs from the Succession States, and she would have, in addition, a great German area in which she would find scope for her commercial and financial activities. Even if Naumann

were but playing the part of the Tempter, who said "All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me," he undoubtedly told the truth when he said:

The whole of Germany is now more open to the Viennese crafts than ever before. The Viennese might make an artistic conquest extending to Hamburg and Danzig.

But not only would Austria find a market for her industrial products in Germany, she would become the great trading center between Germany and southeast Europe, and in that way would once more be, but in a newer and better sense than before, the *Ostmark* of the German people.

The absorption of Austria in Germany is opposed by France, mainly because she can not conceive that her great secular struggle with the people on the other side of the Rhine will ever come to an end, and she fears the addition of 6,500,000 to the population of her ancient enemy. But quite apart from the fact that Germany and Austria can not permanently be prevented from following a common destiny if they so desire, and apart from the fact that politically it is desirable they should do so with at least the tacit assent of the Allied Powers rather than in face of their avowed hostility, there are reasons for thinking that any danger to which France might be exposed by the additional man-power given to Germany would be more than compensated for by the altered political condition in Germany herself. Vienna would form an effective counterpoise to Berlin, and all the more so because she is a great geographical center, while Berlin is more or less a political creation. The South German people have never loved the latter city, and today they love her less than ever. In Vienna they would find not only a kindred civilization with which they would be in sympathy, but a political leadership to which they would readily give heed. In such a Germany, divided in its allegiance between Berlin and Vienna, Prussian animosity to France would be more or less neutralized. Nor would Germany suffer disproportionately to her gain, since in the intermingling of Northern efficiency with Southern culture she would find a remedy for much of the present discontents. When the time comes, and Austria seeks to ally herself with her kin, we hope that no impassable obstacle will be placed in her way.

The long and as yet unsettled controversy on the limits of the Italian Kingdom illustrates very well the difficulties which may arise when geographical and ethnical conditions are subordinated to considerations of military strategy, history, and senti-

ment in the determination of national boundaries. The annexation of the Alto Adige has been generally accepted as inevitable. It is true that the population is German, but here, as in Bohemia, geographical conditions appear to speak the final word. Strategically also the frontier is good, and will do much to allay Italian anxiety with regard to the future. Hence, although ethnical conditions are to some extent ignored, the settlement which has been made will probably be a lasting one.

On the east the natural frontier of Italy obviously runs across the uplands from some point near the eastern extremity of the Carnic Alps to the Adriatic. The pre-war frontier was unsatisfactory for one reason because it assigned to Austria the essentially Italian region of the lower Isonzo. But once the lowlands are left on the west the uplands which border them on the east, whether Alpine or Karst, mark the natural limits of the Italian Kingdom, and beyond a position on them for strategic reasons the Italians have no claims in this direction except what they can establish on ethnical grounds. To these, therefore, we turn. In Carniola the Slovenes are in a large majority, and in Gorizia they also form the bulk of the population. On the other hand, in the town and district of Trieste the Italians predominate, and they also form a solid block on the west coast of Istria, though the rest of that country is peopled mainly by Slovenes. It seems to follow, therefore, that the plains of the Isonzo, the district of Trieste, and the west coast of Istria, with as much of the neighboring upland as is necessary to secure their safety and communications, should be Italian and that the remainder should pass to the Jugo-Slavs. The so-called Wilson line, which runs from the neighborhood of Tarvis to the mouth of the Arsa, met these requirements fairly well, though it placed from 300,000 to 400,000 Jugo-Slavs under Italian rule, to less than 50,000 Italians, half of whom are in Fiume itself transferred to the Jugo-Slavs. Any additional territory must, by incorporating a larger alien element, be a source of weakness and not of strength to Italy. To Fiume the Italians have no claim beyond the fact that in the town itself they slightly outnumber the Croats, though in the double town of Fiume-Sushak there is a large Slav majority. Beyond the sentimental reasons which they urge in public, however, there is the economic argument, which, perhaps wisely, they keep in the background. So long as Trieste and Fiume belonged to the same empire the limits within which each operated were fairly well defined, but if Fiume become Jugo-Slav it will not only prove a serious rival to Trieste, but will prevent Italy

from exercising absolute control over much of the trade of Central Europe. For Trieste itself Italy has in truth little need, and the present condition of that city is eloquent testimony of the extent to which it depended for its prosperity upon the Austrian and German Empires. In the interests, then, not only of Jugo-Slavia but of Europe generally, Fiume must not become Italian, and the idea of constituting it a Free State might well be abandoned. Its development is more fully assured as the one great port of Jugo-Slavia than under any other form of government.

With regard to Italian claims in the Adriatic, little need be said. To the Dalmatian coast Italy has no right either on geographical or on ethnical grounds, and the possession of Pola, Valona, and some of the islands gives her all the strategic advantages which she has reason to demand. But, after all, the only danger which could threaten her in the Adriatic would come from Jugo-Slavia, and her best insurance against that danger would be an agreement by which the Adriatic should be neutralized. The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian fleet offers Italy a great opportunity of which she would do well to take advantage.

Of the prospects of Jugo-Slavia it is hard to speak with any feeling of certainty. With the exception of parts of Croatia-Slavonia and of Southern Hungary, the country is from the physical point of view essentially Balkan, and diversity rather than unity is its most pronounced characteristic. From this physical diversity there naturally results a diversity in outlook which might indeed be all to the good if the different parts of the country were linked together by a well-developed system of communication. Owing to the structure of the land, however, such a system will take long to complete.

Ethnic affinity forms the real basis of union, but whether that union implies unity is another matter. It is arguable that repulsion from the various peoples—Magyars, Turks, and Austrians—by whom they have been oppressed, rather than the attraction of kinship, is the force which has brought the Jugo-Slavs together. In any case the obstacles in the way of the growth of a strong national feeling are many. Serb, Croat, and Slovene, though they are all members of the Slav family, have each their distinctions and characteristics which political differences may tend to exaggerate rather than obliterate. In Serbian Macedonia, again, out of a total population of 1,100,000, there are 400,000 to 500,000 people who, though Slavs, are Bulgarian in their sympathies, and between Serb and Bulgarian

there will long be bitter enmity. Religious differences are not wanting. The Serbs belong to the Orthodox Church, but the Croats are Catholics, and in Bosnia there is a strong Mohammedan element. Cultural conditions show a wide range. The Macedonian Serb, who has but lately escaped from Turkish misrule, the untutored but independent Montenegrin, the Dalmatian, with his long traditions of Italian civilization, the Serb of the kingdom, a sturdy fighter but without great political insight, and the Croat and Slovene, whose intellectual superiority is generally admitted, all stand on different levels in the scale of civilization. To build up out of elements in many respects so diverse a common nationality without destroying what is best in each will be a long and laborious task. Economic conditions are not likely to be of much assistance. It is true that they are fairly uniform throughout Jugo-Slavia, and it is improbable that the economic interests of different regions will conflict to any great extent. On the other hand, since each region is more or less self-supporting, they will naturally unite into an economic whole less easily than if there had been greater diversity. What the future holds for Jugo-Slavia it is as yet impossible to say; but the country is one of great potentialities, and a long period of political rest might render possible the development of an important State.

This brings me to my conclusion. I have endeavored to consider the great changes which have been made in Europe not in regard to the extent to which they do or do not comply with the canons of boundary-making, for after all there are no frontiers in Europe which can in these days of modern warfare be considered as providing a sure defence, but in regard rather to the stability of the states concerned. A great experiment has been made in the new settlement of Europe, and an experiment which contains at least the germs of success. But in many ways it falls far short of perfection, and even if it were perfect it could not be permanent. The methods which ought to be adopted to render it more equable and to adapt it to changing needs it is not for us to discuss here. But as geographers engaged in the study of the ever-changing relations of man to his environment we can play an important part in the formation of that enlightened public opinion upon which alone a society of nations can be established.